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COMMENTS
Rx FOR LIABILITY:
ADVOCATING THE ELIMINATION OF THE
PHARMACIST'S NO DUTY TO WARN RULE
EDWARD CASMERE*
In modern societies, prescriptiondrugspose one of the greatest
human-createddangers outside of war.
Today's drugs may be likened to ballistic missiles with atomic
warheads, while we prescribe, dispense, and administer them
as if they were bows and arrows.
CAVEAT EMPTOR
Jack's pharmacy was crowded again.
He had been a
pharmacist in Illinois for twenty years, but the last five had been
really hectic. Every day he filled an increasing number of
prescriptions. His customers would wait patiently at the deli
counter for fifteen minutes, but they would be irate if they had to
wait ten minutes to get a prescription filled.
Jack started to fill a prescription for Johnny Smith when he
remembered that he had filled a different prescription (from the
same doctor) for Johnny three days earlier. Jack was going to call
the doctor who wrote the prescription, but the last time he
questioned this doctor, Jack was subjected to a lecture on who had
the medical degree and who did not. Jack figured that the doctor
had fully advised Johnny and his mother about the potential drug
interaction.
That night Johnny took the two medications together. As a
result of a drug interaction between the two medications, Johnny
died. Johnny's doctor never warned against any possible drug
interaction. The doctor did not know if the two medications would
1. THOMAS J. MOORE, PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER 46 (1998).

2. The Role of the Pharmacist in Comprehensive Medication Use
Management, APhA White Paper, at 2 (Mar. 1992) (quoting Donald D.
Francke, founder and editor of DRUG INTELLIGENCE 1967). This article was
cited in the Supplemental Memorandum Amicus Curiae of The Illinois
Pharmacists Association app. 1, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d
557 (Ill. 1992) (No. 72908).
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interact, but he assumed that the pharmacist would have a "duty
to warn"3 against any potential interaction between the
medications. Unfortunately, the doctor's assumption was wrong
because in Illinois, pharmacists have no such obligation.4
INTRODUCTION

On August 28, 1986, Stephen Frye underwent arthroscopic
knee surgery and obtained a post-operation prescription for
After the hospital released
Fiorinalu from his physician!
Stephen, his mother went to the Medicare-Glaser pharmacy to
have the prescription filled.7 Evelyn Nightengale, MedicareGlaser's pharmacist on duty, filled the prescription exactly as
prescribed, with the proper dosage and number of capsules.8 The
written prescription from Stephen's physician did not instruct that
However, Evelyn
any warnings be given to the patient.9
Nightengale placed two warning labels on the container. The
labels contained a federally-required statement prohibiting the
transfer of the drug to persons other than the patient, and a
"drowsy eye" warning label stating that the drug "May Cause
3. See Nicholas J. Lynn & William Sander Callahan, The Court's View of
the Pharmacist'sDuty to Warn, J. PHARMACY PRAC., Aug. 1988, at 65 (stating

that "[tihe debate continues as to whether pharmacists are merely retailers of

The relationship between the increasing benefits of
drugs or professionals ....
professionalism and the corresponding duties of professionalism has been a
subject of much concern, especially over the amorphous concept referred to as
the 'duty to warn.'). "[Tihe term duty to warn means generally the duty of a
pharmacist to warn a patient or physician of the known risks and dangerous
propensities associated with the use of a particular drug." Id. at 65 n.1. For
purposes of this Comment, the phrase "duty to warn" shall have the same
general meaning as discussed above. See also 63A AM. JUR. 2D Pharmacies §
1133 (1984 & Supp. 1997) (discussing whether pharmacists should have a
duty to warn in products liability cases under the general rule that sellers

have a duty to warn of the risks associated with the use of the product sold).
4. Currently pharmacists have no duty to warn in Illinois. See Jones v.
Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399, 402 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that a pharmacist had no

duty to warn a patient or physician that the medication has been prescribed in
App. Ct.
dangerous amounts); Fakhouri v. Taylor, 618 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ill.
1993) (holding that the pharmacist filling a prescription had no duty to warn

the patient of excessive dosages); Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (holding that pharmacists are not required to give warnings
that they were not directed to give by the patient's physician).

5. Fiorinal ® is a registered trademark of the Sandoz Pharmaceuticals
Corporation. "Fiorinal® is indicated for the relief of the symptom complex of
tension (or muscle contraction) headache." PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE
2052 (48th ed. 1994).
6. Frye v. Medicare-Glaser, 605 N.E.2d 557, 558 (Ill. 1992). See infra
notes 59-72 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the Frye case.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Drowsiness.""°

Evelyn

Nightengale

disregarded

a

computer

software program that suggested she place a label on the
prescription container warning against consumption of alcohol
while taking Fiorinal. ®1' Stephen's mother left the pharmacy with
no warning against the concurrent use of Fiorinal and alcohol. 2
A few days later, Stephen Frye was found dead.13 He apparently
died from the concurrent consumption of alcohol and Fiorinal. "'
If Evelyn Nightengale had provided a warning against
concurrent use of Fiorinal and alcohol, would Stephen Frye have
lived?"
Should pharmacists ever be required to provide a
warning? Should there be a standard that mandates a warning if
the pharmacist believes a prescription may contain an excessively
dangerous dosage, a drug interaction, or may otherwise be
dangerous in certain circumstances (such as the combination of
alcohol and Fiorinal®)?
Currently in Illinois, pharmacists have no duty to warn a
patient or the patient's physician of the dangers associated with a
prescribed drug ("no duty to warn rule").'7
This Comment
discusses the reasoning behind the no duty to warn rule, and
whether it should be eliminated in Illinois. 8 Part I of this

10. Id.
11. Frye, 605 N.E.2d. at 559. Pharmacist Nightengale testified that she did

not place an alcohol warning label on Frye's prescription because in the past,
similar labels had offended customers and she had been "chewed out" for
placing alcohol warning labels on other prescriptions. Id. Medicare-Glaser
had a computer software program that printed a document suggesting specific

warning labels to be placed on corresponding prescription containers. Id. The
PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 5, at 2052, warns that: concurrent
use of Fiorinal and alcohol should be avoided, Fiorinal ® can impair the
mental/physical abilities of the patient, and "Itihe abuse liability of Fiorinal® is
similar to that of other barbiturate-containing drug combinations."
12. Frye, 605 N.E.2d at 558.
13. Id. Stephen Frye was found dead on September 3, 1986, and was
estimated to have died on September 1, 1986. Id.
14. Id. at 558. Since the court granted Medicare-Glaser's and Evelyn
Nightengale's motion for summary judgment, it was never determined at trial
what caused Stephen Frye's death. Id. at 559. The Supreme Court of Illinois

had to assume that the concurrent use of alcohol and Fiorinal® caused Stephen

Frye's death. Id. "[Wie assume that Stephen Frye died from the combined use
of alcohol and Fiorinal." Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id.

16. See Advincula v. United Blood Serv., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1020 (Ill. 1996)
(holding that the professional standard of care in Illinois is that which an
"ordinarily careful professional would exercise under similar circumstances").
See infra Part II (analyzing the no duty to warn rule) and Part III (proposing
possible alterations to the rule).
17. See infra notes 28-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the no
duty to warn rule in Illinois.
18. This Comment focuses on the no duty to warn rule in Illinois, but the
arguments made herein may apply to any state that continues to uphold a
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Comment provides an overview of the current no duty to warn rule
in Illinois, and introduces the arguments supporting the rule.
Part II analyzes the no duty to warn rule. Finally, Part III argues
that the no duty to warn rule should be eliminated.
I.

SETTING THE STAGE FOR PHARMACIST LIABILITY: THE CURRENT
No DUTY TO WARN RULE IN ILLINOIS
To assert that a pharmacist has a duty to warn, a plaintiff
must file an action against a pharmacist for negligence. 9 In
Illinois, a claim for negligence "must set forth the existence of a
duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty,
and an injury proximately resulting from that breach."" The
practice of pharmacy is considered to be a professional practice in
Illinois.2 ' Logically, a pharmacist should be required to act
according to a professional standard." The Restatement (Second)
of Torts states that a practitioner of a profession is required to
"exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members
of that profession."
Therefore, if a pharmacist breaches the
professional standard, by failing to exercise the skill and
knowledge normally possessed by other pharmacists, that
pharmacist should be liable for any injury that proximately results

pharmacist's no duty to warn rule. It should also be noted that this Comment
will not focus on other tort actions that may result from the acts or omissions
of the pharmacist or pharmacy (e.g., misreading a prescription, filling a
prescription with the wrong drug, filling a prescription with a non-prescribed
dosage, failing to check for a drug interaction after advertising that the store's
computer will check for drug interaction, or errors in dispensing the proper
medication to the proper patient). See e.g., Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 544
N.W.2d 727, 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a pharmacist voluntarily
assumed a duty to warn a patient when the pharmacy advertised a system
that would detect drug interactions and warn customers). This Comment will
focus only on the no duty to warn rule in malpractice/negligence suits against
pharmacists or pharmacies.
19. See generally Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, 562 N.E.2d 967, 969 (Ill.
1990) (discussing the requirements for a negligence action in Illinois).
20. Id. at 968.
21. The Pharmacy Practice Act of 1987, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/1 (West
1996).
22. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that "[in Illinois, the established
standard of care for all professionals is stated as the use of the same degree of
knowledge, skill and ability as an ordinarily careful professional would
exercise under similar circumstances." Advincula v. United Blood Serv., 678
N.E.2d 1009, 1020 (Ill. 1996). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 132 (5th ed. 1984) (stating
pharmacists should not only exercise reasonable care, but also exercise care
associated with the pharmacist's special knowledge).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965). For purposes of this
Comment, the standard of care of a pharmacist will be referred to as that of a
reasonable and prudent pharmacist in the same factual situation.
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from the breach of care.'
However, in Illinois, a pharmacist
cannot be found negligent for failing to warn against the
dangerous propensity of a prescription drug, regardless of what
the professional pharmacist standard requires, because there is a
blanket no duty to warn rule for pharmacists.'
Although Illinois courts have held that pharmacists have no
duty to warn the patient or the patient's physician of the
dangerousness of prescription drugs, several other jurisdictions
maintain that pharmacists may have a duty to warn. 6 Should
Illinois follow the lead of these jurisdictions and eliminate the no
24. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
professional standard of care. If the standard of care of a professional in
Illinois is using the "skill and ability as an ordinarily careful professional
would exercise under similar circumstances," then a professional not using
such care acts below the standard of care of a professional. Advincula, 678
N.E.2d at 1020. See infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the professional pharmacist standard of care.
25. Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551, 554-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
See infra notes 28-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the no duty
to warn rule in Illinois.
26. See e.g., Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d
1129, 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that pharmacists have a duty to act
within the applicable professional standard of care, and therefore, the
question of whether the pharmacist breached that duty is a question for a
jury); Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ind. 1994)
(holding that society has an interest in the proper use of prescription drugs,
giving pharmacists a duty will help to further the societal interest in the
proper use of prescription drugs, and "pharmacists must exercise that degree
of care that an ordinarily prudent pharmacist would under the same or
similar circumstances."); Guillory v. Dr. X & ABC Pharmacy, 679 So. 2d 1004,
1010 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that pharmacists have a duty to correctly fill
a prescription as written by a physician, and to warn the physician or the
patient of an excessive dosage or obvious inadequacies that create a
substantial risk of harm to the patient); Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d
121, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding that a pharmacist having knowledge
that a patient is an alcoholic may have a duty to warn that patient of the
dangers involved in prescription drugs that should not be taken with alcohol);
Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding
that a pharmacist had a duty to exercise due care in performance of
professional duties and the pharmacist breached that duty by not warning the
patient or notifying the patient's physician "of the obvious inadequacies
appearing on the face of the prescription"); Pittman v. UpJohn Co., 890 S.W.2d
425, 434 (Tenn. 1994) (holding that pharmacists have a duty to exercise the
standard of care required by pharmacists in the same or similar communities
in which the pharmacist practices, and that the learned intermediary rule is
not a defense for a pharmacist who did not warn a customer of a possible drug
interaction between two drugs prescribed by the same physician); Dooley v.
Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that pharmacists
are professionals that should exercise a standard of care that is required by
the pharmacy profession within the community that the pharmacist practices,
and the question of whether a pharmacist owes a duty to warn against
potential drug interactions is a question of fact for a jury).
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duty to warn rule? 7
A. Illinois Precedent
In 1932, the Illinois Appellate Court held in
Jones v.
Walgreen Co. that a pharmacist's duty requires use of the highest
degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and diligence, in proportion to
the danger involved.' In Walgreen, the plaintiff suffered an injury
when a pharmacist misinterpreted a physician's handwriting on
the prescription and filled the prescription with the wrong drug.'
As a result of ingesting the improper drug, the plaintiff suffered a
coma-like state for several days. a° The jury found in favor of the
plaintiff, and the court of appeals affirmed the verdict.3' The
Walgreen court stated that people entrust their lives to
pharmacists, and that even a minimal deviation from the
pharmacist's proper care could have fatal results. 2 Although
Walgreen involved an improperly-filled prescription and not a
failure to warn against the dangerous propensities of a
prescription drug, the appellate court notably held that the
pharmacist's duty was properly determined by comparing the
defendant pharmacist's conduct to that of a "competent and
careful pharmacist."'
27. See supra note 26 for a list of jurisdictions holding that a pharmacist
may have a duty to warn.
28. 265 Ill. App. 308, 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1932). In Walgreen, a pharmacist
misread a prescription causing him to fill the prescription with a much
stronger dose of medication. Id. at 317. The resulting strong dosage caused
the patient to suffer severe nausea, pain, vomiting, a coma-like state that
lasted two days, and other adverse reactions. Id. at 311-12.
29. Id. at 316-17. The prescription called for "Strontium Salicylate four
ounces (Wyatt)." Id. at 311. Strontium salicylate "is a combination formed by
combining strontium with salicylic acid... . It is used especially in the
treatment of rheumatism." Id. at 312. The pharmacist assumed that Wyatt
referred to a manufacturer. Id. at 311. The pharmacist was unable to locate a
manufacturer named Wyatt and subsequently filled the prescription with a
strontium salicylate manufactured by Parke-Davis & Company. Id. at 317.
The prescription intended to indicate a much weaker effervescent strontium
salicylate manufactured by Wyeth. Id.
30. Id. at 311-12.
31. Id. at 317. The appellate court held that the verdict should be affirmed
for $10,000 on remittitur because the court concluded that the jury's verdict
for $20,000 was excessive. Id.
32. Id. at 315. The trial court stated that 'ipleople trust not merely their
health, but their lives, to the knowledge, care, and prudence of druggists, and
in many cases a slight want of care is liable to prove fatal to some one [sic]."
Id.
33. Jones. 265 Ill. App. at 320. During the trial, two pharmacists and the
pharmacy manager testified that they would have either known what the
name on the prescription meant, or they would have called the prescribing
physician to clarify the prescription. Id. at 317-20. The court stated: "It would
be sufficient... to say that the jury were [sic] fully warranted, under all the
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Walgreen remained the exclusive interpretation of Illinois law
on a pharmacist's duty until 1985 when the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois decided Jones v. Irvin.'
In Jones, the court addressed the issue of whether a pharmacist
was negligent for failing to warn a patient or the patient's
physician about drugs prescribed in dangerous quantities. 5 The
court held that Walgreen was not controlling because Walgreen
addressed an improperly filled prescription, while the defendant
pharmacist in Jones properly filled the prescription as prescribed
by the physician. 3 The Jones court held that because Illinois law
was silent on the issue before it, the court must "put on its
soothsayer hat" and attempt to predict what the Illinois Supreme
Court would hold in this situation. 7 Based on the decisions of
several other jurisdictions, the Jones court assumed that the
Illinois Supreme Court would hold that pharmacists have no duty
to warn.'
Using that assumption, the Jones court held that
Illinois pharmacists have no duty to warn the patient or the
evidence in this case, in finding that a competent and careful pharmacist

would have understood what was meant by [the name on the prescription]."
Id. at 320.
34. 602 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ill. 1985).
35. Id. at 400. The court stated:

The precise issue before this Court is whether a pharmacist, who
correctly fills a prescription, is negligent for failing to warn the customer
or notify the physician that the drug is being prescribed in dangerous
amounts, that the customer is being over medicated, or that the various
drugs in their prescribed quantities could cause adverse reactions to the
customer.

Id.
36. Id. The Jones court distinguished its situation from Walgreen by
pointing out that the pharmacist in Walgreen actually misread the
prescription at issue in that case, and the pharmacist in Jones filled the
prescription exactly as written. Id. "Therefore, in as much as [Walgreen] was
addressing a different factual situation, it is not controlling in this case." Id.
at 401.
37. Id. The court stated that it must "put on its soothsayer hat" to predict
how the Illinois Supreme Court would decide this issue because "[wihen state
law is unsettled, the federal court must attempt to predict how the state's
highest court would rule if confronted with the issue." 17 JAMES WM. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 124.22[21 (3d ed. 1998). The Jones court
declined to apply the Walgreen reasoning that an Illinois pharmacist's duty
and subsequent breach is properly determined by comparing the defendant

pharmacist's conduct to the conduct of a "competent and careful pharmacist."
Id.
38. Jones, 602 F. Supp. at 402. The court cited Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store,
457 So.2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), which held that pharmacists have no
duty to warn when they have properly filled prescriptions; Lemire v. Garrard
Drugs, 291 N.W.2d 103 (Mich. App. Ct. 1980, which held that a pharmacist is

not liable when properly filling a prescription; and Batiste v. American Home
Prod. Corp., 231 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977), which held that pharmacists
have no duty to warn of the dangers of prescription drugs.
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patient's physician that the drug being prescribed could endanger
the patient's life. 9
Shortly after Jones, an Illinois Appellate Court applied the
pharmacist's no duty to warn rule in Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co.4'
In Eldridge, the plaintiffs wife died from an overdose of a
prescribed drug, resulting in a wrongful death action which
alleged that the pharmacy negligently failed to warn that the
prescription contained abnormal dosages. 4' The Eldridge court
cited Walgreen, but held that no Illinois court has determined
whether a pharmacist has a duty to warn.42 Based on Jones, the
Eldridge court became the first Illinois Appellate Court to hold
that pharmacists have no duty to warn a patient's physician that a
drug is being prescribed in an abnormal quantity.4" The Eldridge
court determined that pharmacists should have no duty to warn
because that duty belongs to the physician." The court reasoned
that if it imposed a duty to warn on pharmacists, then
pharmacists "would have to interject [themselves] into the doctorpatient relationship and practice medicine without a license. " '
In 1987, the Illinois Supreme Court appeared to condone the
Eldridge and Jones decisions by favorably mentioning them in
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center.46 Although the

39. Jones, 602 F. Supp. at 402. The court stated that "a pharmacist has no
duty to warn the customer or notify the physician that the drug is being
prescribed in dangerous amounts, that the customer is being over medicated,
or that the various drugs in their prescribed quantities could cause adverse
reactions to the customer." Id.
40. 485 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
41. Id. at 552.
42. Id. at 552.
43. See id. at 553-55 ("We, therefore, hold a pharmacist has no common law
or statutory duty to refuse to fill a prescription simply because it is for a
quantity beyond that normally prescribed or to warn the patient's physician of
that fact.").
44. See id. at 553 (reasoning that drug manufacturers have a duty to warn
physicians and physicians have a duty to warn patients because the
physicians act as learned intermediaries).
See infra note 49 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the learned intermediary rule. The
court felt that it was the duty of the physician to assess and evaluate the
patient's needs, know the characteristics of the drugs available for treatment,
and prescribe a drug accordingly. Eldridge, 485 N.E.2d at 552-53.
45. See Eldridge, 485 N.E.2d at 553 (holding that the application of a
prescription requires knowledge of the drug and the patient's condition and
inquiry into the patient's condition would amount to the practice of medicine
without a license). The plaintiff in Eldridge asserted that pharmacists may
have greater knowledge concerning prescription drugs than the physicians
that are prescribing them. Id. As a consequence of this greater knowledge,
the plaintiff asserted that pharmacists should supervise the application of the
physician's prescription. Id.
46. 513 N.E.2d 387 (Ill. 1987). In Kirk, a driver lost control of his
automobile after an allegedly adverse drug reaction and injured the plaintiff.
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Kirk court did not address the issue of a pharmacist's failure to
warn, it did cite Jones and Eldridge as analogous support for the
contention that the employees of a defendant hospital should not
have a duty to provide warnings that were not given by the
physician.47 The Kirk court found that the prescribing physician
had the discretion to determine which warnings a patient should
receive regarding prescription drugs."
Significantly, the Kirk
decision is important to Illinois common law because the court
adopted the learned intermediary rule4 9 which precludes drug
manufacturers from having a duty to warn patients, and instead
compels physicians to warn patients of the dangers of prescription
drugs."
In 1988, the Illinois Appellate Court determined that
pharmacists have no duty to provide their customers with a
written copy of the known risks and side effects of prescription
drugs in Leesley v. West.5 In Leesley, the plaintiff asserted that
the pharmacy that filled a prescription should have warned the
plaintiff of the known side effects of peptic ulcer and
gastrointestinal bleeding.52
The appellate court held that no
requirement mandated pharmacists to give warnings not
requested by the prescribing physician.53 The court concluded that
pharmacists have no duty to warn because pharmacists could not
be reasonably expected to foresee a customer's injury.'
Id. at 390-91. The plaintiff brought suit against the driver's physicians and
the hospital for negligently failing to warn the driver of possible adverse
reactions to the prescription drugs. Id. at 391. The plaintiff also asserted that
the drug manufacturers and the hospital were liable under a theory of strict
liability for failing to adequately warn. Id.
47. Id. at 396.
48. Id. at 395.
49. See id. at 392 (discussing the learned intermediary rule). The learned

intermediary rule provides that drug manufacturers have a duty to warn
physicians of the dangers of prescription drugs, and physicians have the duty
to inform their patients. Id. Drug manufacturers usually communicate
warnings to physicians through various mediums, such as the PHYSICIANS
DESK REFERENCE, drug package inserts, and letters. Id. at 392-93. The
physician then functions as a learned intermediary between the drug

manufacturer and the patient by choosing which drug and what warnings
should be given to the patient. Id. at 393.
50. See id. at 393 (holding that since drug manufacturers have no duty to
warn the user of the drug, the drug manufacturers certainly had no duty to

third-party non-users, namely, the plaintiff in Kirk).
51. 518 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
52. Id. at 759.
53. See id. at 763 ("We simply decline to subject pharmacists to liability for

failure to give warnings which the physician has not requested. We believe
that this position is most consistent with this State's legislative policy against
expanding the liability risks of health professionals.").
54. See id. at 762 (finding that the foreseeability of a customer's injury

requires knowledge of a customer's medical history and condition-to which
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Additionally, the Leesley court held that providing warnings to
customers would be "very burdensome" on pharmacists."
The
court further reasoned that requiring pharmacists to warn
patients was inconsistent with the learned intermediary rule.'
The Leesley court noted that it would be inconsistent for a drug
manufacturer and a pharmacist (who actually hands the drug to
the customer) to have different duties.57 The Leesley court, in
dicta, maintained that warnings, aside from those required by the
physician, are not harmful nor should they be discouraged."
In 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to review the no
59
duty to warn rule in Frye v. Medicare-Glaser.
The special
administrator of Stephen Frye's estate filed a negligent
undertaking action alleging that Stephen died from a concurrent
use of Fiorinal® and alcohol.' Allegedly, Stephen's death resulted
from the failure of his physician, the Medicare-Glaser pharmacy,
and Evelyn Nightengale, the pharmacist, to warn of the danger of
concurrent use of alcohol and Fiorinal." 1 The estate claimed that
although the pharmacy and the pharmacist had no duty to warn of
the dangerous side effects of Fiorinal, ® they undertook a duty to
warn when they placed a "drowsy eye" label on the prescription
container.62 The estate asserted that because they undertook the
duty to warn, their failure to place an alcohol warning on the
prescription container constituted negligence.
The trial court
granted Medicare-Glaser and Evelyn Nightengale's motion for
summary judgment, but the appellate court reversed."
The

pharmacists cannot be expected to be privy).
55. Id.
56. See Lesley, 518 N.E.2d at 763 (Ill. 1985) (reasoning that requiring drug

manufacturers to provide the same information to customers that they provide
to physicians and pharmacists would undermine the learned intermediary
rule). The court stated that "[pilacing [a duty to warn] on pharmacists is
simply inconsistent with the exemption afforded manufacturers by the learned
intermediary doctrine." Id. See supra note 49, and infra notes 93-102 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the learned intermediary rule.
57. Leesley, 518 N.E.2d at 763.

58. Id.
59. 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992).
60. Id. at 558. See also supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the factual background of Frye.
61. Frye, 605 N.E.2d at 558. The special administrator of Stephen Frye's
estate filed an action against the prescribing physician for failing to warn of
the dangerous side effects of Fiorinal ® and against the Medicare-Glaser
Corporation and Evelyn Nightengale on the theory of negligent undertaking.

Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.

The plaintiff asserted the theory of negligent undertaking,

specifically stating that the defendant voluntarily undertook a duty to warn.
Id.
64. Id. The appellate court held that the voluntary undertaking theory was

2000]

Pharmacist'sNo Duty To Warn Rule

Illinois Supreme Court granted Medicare-Glaser and Evelyn
Nightengale's petition for leave to appeal.65
The Illinois Pharmacists Association6 and the National
Association of Boards of Pharmacy67 filed briefs as amici curiae
requesting the Court to determine whether pharmacists have a
duty to warn customers of the dangerous propensities of
prescription drugs.' However, the Illinois Supreme Court decided
not to consider the issue because the parties to the action did not
raise it. 9 The Court then proceeded to affirm the grant of
summary judgment for Evelyn Nightengale and Medicare-Glaser. 7"
The Court held that the extent of the pharmacist's duty was to
perform the voluntary undertaking (placing the "drowsy eye
label")
without
negligence
and
found
that
the
pharmacist/pharmacy
did
not
negligently
perform
this
undertaking.7' The Frye court did not state that the sole source of
warnings should be the prescribing physician; rather, patients
should "principally look to their prescribing physician" for
warnings relating to prescription drugs.72
In 1993, the Illinois Appellate Court again upheld the no duty

the proper theory of recovery, and that: "[diefendants can, therefore, be liable
for injuries or death to the consumer if they undertook to warn the consumer
of the dangerous side effects of a prescription drug and did so negligently." Id.
at 560 (citing Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 579 N.E.2d 1255 (Iln. App. Ct.
1991)).
65. Id. at 558.
66. The Illinois Pharmacists Association requested that the Illinois
Supreme Court "recognize pharmacists as professionals, and impose upon the

pharmacy profession the same duty as that owed by other professionals
practicing their professions."

Memorandum Amicus Curiae of The Illinois

Pharmacists Association at 9, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557
(Ill. 1992) (No. 72908).
67. The National Association of Boards of Pharmacy "are charged with the
responsibility of licensing pharmacists and pharmacies and regulating the
profession of pharmacy." Brief Amicus Curiae for The National Association of
Boards of Pharmacy at 2, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill.
1992) (No. 72908). The National Association of Boards of Pharmacy requested
that the Illinois Supreme Court impose a duty on pharmacists to counsel
patients on potential adverse reactions to pharmaceuticals. Id. at 34.
68. Frye, 605 N.E.2d at 559. The Illinois Pharmacists Association, the
National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, and the Illinois Trial Lawyers
Association filed amicus curiae briefs with the Illinois Supreme Court. Id. at
558. The Illinois Supreme Court granted Evelyn Nightengale and MedicareGlaser's petition for leave to appeal after the trial court granted MedicareGlaser's motion for summary judgment and the appellate court reversed. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 561.
71. Id. See also supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text for a discussion

of the voluntarily undertaking rule.
72. Frye, 605 N.E.2d at 561.
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to warn rule in Fakhouri v. Taylor.73 In Fakhouri, the plaintiff
brought an action for wrongful death caused by an overdose of
Imipramine 4 against the pharmacists that filled the prescription,
the pharmacy, and the prescribing physician.7" The Fakhouri
court relied on Leesley, Eldridge, and Kirk, holding that
pharmacists should not have a duty to warn patients that a
prescription exceeds the recommended dosage.76 The Fakhouri
court also relied on the learned intermediary rule to further
support the pharmacists no duty to warn rule."
In 1996, the Illinois Appellate Court found in Suarez v.
Pierard that pharmacists often advise and counsel patients."8 In
Suarez, the plaintiff sued a pharmacist for allegedly disclosing
confidential information about the plaintiff.79 The Suarez court
held that a pharmacist should not be considered a therapist under
the Confidentiality Act,"° and therefore could not disclose
73. 618 N.E.2d 518, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
74. See generally PHYSIcIANs' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 5, at 992-94
(discussing Imipramine Hydrochloride). Physicians prescribe Imipramine
Hydrochloride for the relief of depression symptoms. Id. "Lower dosages are
also recommended for outpatients as compared to hospitalized patients who
will be under close supervision. Dosage should be initiated at a low level and
increased gradually, noting carefully the clinical response and any evidence of
intolerance." Id. at 994. The PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE also states:
It should be kept in mind that the possibility of suicide in seriously
depressed patients is inherent in the illness and may persist until
significant remission occurs.
Such patients should be carefully
supervised during the early phase of treatment with imipramine
hydrochloride, and may require hospitalization. Prescriptionsshould be
written for the smallest amount feasible.
Id. at 992 (emphasis added).
75. Fakhouri, 618 N.E.2d at 519.
76. Id. at 519-21. The court stated that "[t]o impose a duty to warn on the
pharmacist would be to place the pharmacist in the middle of the doctorpatient relationship, without the physician's knowledge of the patient." Id. at
521. See Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551, 563 (Ill. 1985) (stating
that a pharmacist's duty might interfere with the physician-patient
relationship).
77. Fakhouri, 618 N.E.2d at 521. The court stated that "it is illogical and
unreasonable to impose a greater duty on the pharmacist who properly fills a
prescription than is imposed in the drug's manufacturer." Id. See Leesley v.
West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (stating that a pharmacist's
duty would be inconsistent with the learned intermediary rule).
78. 663 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
79. Id. at 1041. The pharmacist counseled the plaintiff concerning the use
of her medication for the treatment of mental health disorders at the
pharmacy. Id. Later, the pharmacist discussed the plaintiffs treatment with
the plaintiff during a chance meeting at a tavern. Id. The pharmacist's
discussion with the plaintiff was said to be overheard by several people, which
allegedly humiliated the plaintiff. Id.
80. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 et seq. (West 1992) (commonly known as
the Confidentiality Act).
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confidential information in violation of that act."' Although Suarez
did not address the issue of whether pharmacists have a duty to
warn, this decision is important to the discussion of the no duty to
warn rule because the court acknowledged that pharmacists
advise and counsel patients by giving warnings of potential side
effects.82
Specifically, the special concurrence stated that
pharmacists "do much more" than simply fill prescriptions; they
"counsel patients on drug interactions."8
Although Illinois case law contains only a limited discussion
of the pharmacist's no duty to warn, the courts that have
discussed this issue have held that pharmacists should have no
duty to warn." Generally, three theories have been cited as
support for the no duty to warn rule in Illinois:
(1) imposing a duty to warn on pharmacists would interfere
with the physician-patient relationship,
(2) imposing a duty to warn on pharmacists would violate the
learned intermediary rule, and
81. See Suarez, 663 N.E.2d at 1042 (holding that a pharmacist was not

defined as a therapist in section nine of the Confidentiality Act).
Confidentiality Act defines a therapist as

The

a psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, or nurse providing mental
health services or developmental disabilities services or any other
person not prohibited by law from providing such services or from
holding himself out as a therapist if the recipient reasonably believes
that such person is permitted to do so. Therapist includes any successor
of the therapist.
Id.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/2(9) (West 1992).
82. See Suarez, 663 N.E.2d at 1042-43 (discussing warnings about potential
side effects). The court stated:
We do not believe that merely advising a person about the use of drugs
or providing information about the drugs establishes a therapeutic
relationship with that person. Warning about potential side effects is
not therapy, nor does it change the nature of the relationship between a
pharmacist and his customer to that of therapist and patient.
83. Id. at 1044. The special concurring opinion stated, "I disagree with the
assertion that a pharmacist's function is merely that of a supplier of a product.
Pharmacists do much more. They maintain extensive patient records and
counsel patients on drug interactions.
In doing so, they can literally
reconstruct a patient's medical history." Id. (Breslin, J., specially concurring).
84. See Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399, 402 (S.D. Il. 1985) (holding that a
pharmacist has no duty to warn a customer or a physician that a drug has
been prescribed in dangerous amounts, or that the drug could cause adverse
reactions to the customer). See also Fakhouri v. Taylor, 618 N.E.2d 518, 521
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that pharmacists should not have a greater
responsibility to warn than the manufacturer of the prescribed drug);. Leesley
v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that pharmacists
should not be liable for failing to give warnings that the prescribing physician
has not requested); Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551, 554-55 (Ill.
1985) (holding that pharmacists have no common law duty to warn a customer
or a physician that a drug is being prescribed in excessive amounts).
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(3) imposing a duty to warn on pharmacists would contradict
"public policy."'
B. Arguments in Support of the No Duty to Warn Rule
1. Interfering with the Physician-PatientRelationship
Advocates of the no duty to warn rule in Illinois frequently
argue that imposing a duty on pharmacists would interfere with
the physician-patient relationship.'
In Eldridge, the court held
that knowledge of how a drug will affect a patient requires
knowledge of the patient's medical condition. 7
The court
determined that a pharmacist would have to learn the patient's
medical condition before the pharmacist could properly warn the
patient of the effects of a prescription drug.' The court reasoned
that such an intrusion into the physician-patient relationship
would amount to the practice of medicine without a license.89
The Jones court held that placing a duty to warn on
pharmacists would cause each physician's prescription to be
second-guessed by pharmacists attempting to avoid liability and
would result in a disruption of the physician-patient relationship. 90
85. See Jones, 602 F. Supp at 402 (discussing how the imposition of a duty
to warn on pharmacists would adversely affect the physician-patient
relationship); Leesley, 518 N.E.2d at 763 (holding that the learned

intermediary rule would be violated by imposing a duty to warn on
pharmacists, and that expanding the liability of health care professionals is
contrary to Illinois legislative policy).
86. See Jones, 602 F. Supp. at 402 (holding that a pharmacist's duty may
cause each physician's prescription to be second-guessed); Fakhouri, 618
N.E.2d at 521 (holding that a pharmacist's duty may interfere with the
physician-patient relationship); Eldridge, 485 N.E.2d at 553 (holding that a
pharmacist's duty would cause pharmacists to interject themselves into the
physician-patient relationship).
87. Eldridge, 485 N.E.2d at 553.
88. Id.
89. Id. The Eldridge court reasoned that the patient's condition may
determine whether a specific dosage is excessive or not. Id. The court stated
that "[a] prescription which is excessive for one patient may be entirely
reasonable for the treatment of another." Id. The court determined that a
pharmacist cannot accumulate the knowledge necessary to determine whether
a specific dosage is excessive without learning the patient's condition. Id.
Finally, the Eldridge court held that pharmacists could only obtain such
information by interjecting themselves into the physician-patient relationship.
Id.
90. Jones, 602 F. Supp. at 402. The Jones court discussed the duties of
physicians including the duty to know the characteristics of the drug being
prescribed, the duty to know the proper amount of the drug that should be
prescribed, the duty to properly prescribe combinations of drugs, the duty to
warn the patient of the dangers of the drugs being prescribed, and the duty to

inform the patient of how, when, and why to take the drug. Id. The Jones
court also discussed the duty of patients to inform the physician of other drug
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In Fakhouri, the court found that physicians, not pharmacists,
have the knowledge of a patient's complete medical history." The
Fakhouri court reasoned that requiring pharmacists to warn
would place the pharmacist in the middle of the physician-patient
relationship without the benefit of the physician's knowledge of
the patient's complete medical history.'
2.

Violating the Learned IntermediaryRule

Additionally, proponents of the no duty to warn rule in
Illinois argue that imposing a duty on pharmacists would violate
the learned intermediary rule.93 The learned intermediary rule
holds that drug manufacturers have a duty to inform physicians of
the dangers of prescription drugs, and physicians have a duty to
warn patients of those dangers.9 The learned intermediary rule
shifts the manufacturer's duty to warn the patient to the
prescribing physician, making the physician a learned
intermediary between the patient and the drug manufacturer.'
9
Illinois adopted the learned intermediary rule in 1987 in Kirk. 6
The Eldridge court used the learned intermediary rule to
explain why pharmacists should not have a duty to warn.97 The
Eldridge court reasoned that because the physician is the learned
intermediary between the drug manufacturer and the patient, the

prescriptions. Id. Finally, the Jones court discussed the drug manufacturers'
duty to warn physicians of the adverse effects and other precautions
associated with the drugs. Id.
91. Fakhouri,618 N.E.2d at 521.
92. Id.
93. See Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding

that the learned intermediary rule would be abrogated if pharmacists had a
duty to warn); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 392
(IMI.1987) (defining the learned intermediary rule); Eldridge, 485 N.E.2d at
553 (holding that it is the physician that acts as a learned intermediary
between the drug manufacturer and the patient).
94. Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 392. "[Mlanufacturers of prescription drugs have a
duty to warn prescribing physicians of the drug's known dangerous
propensities, and the physicians, in turn, using their medical judgment, have
a duty to convey the warnings to their patients." Id. See generally Diane
Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of LearnedIntermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 1 (1998) (examining the principles

underlying the learned intermediary rule); Nancy K. Plant, The Learned
Intermediary Doctrine: Some New Medicine For An Old Ailment, 81 IOWA L.

REV. 1007 (1996) (discussing the learned intermediary rule).
95. Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 393.
96. Id. The Kirk court held that since the learned intermediary rule
precluded a drug manufacturer from having a duty to warn a patient, it
necessarily followed that the drug manufacturer owed no duty to a third party
who was allegedly injured as a result of the patient's adverse reaction to the
prescription drug. Id.
97. 498 N.E.2d at 553.
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physician, not the pharmacist, has the knowledge and duty to
effectively warn a patient.' Similarly, the Leesley court invoked
the learned intermediary rule as support to uphold the no duty to
warn rule." The Leesley court held that drug manufacturers must
supply warnings to physicians, not consumers, and requiring
pharmacists to. supply warnings to consumers may impose a costly
burden on pharmacists." ° The Leesley court further held that
requiring pharmacists to warn would be inconsistent with the
learned intermediary rule. 0 1 In Fakhouri, the court used the
learned intermediary rule to deny imposing a duty to warn on
pharmacists stating that it would be "illogical and unreasonable to
impose a greater duty on the pharmacist who properly fills a
prescription than is imposed on the drug's manufacturer. " "°
3. "PublicPolicy" Justificationsfor the No Duty to Warn Rule
Supporters of the no duty to warn rule also justify the rule
based on "public policy" reasons.0 3 In Jones, the court stated that a
general policy concern that pharmacists would second-guess every
prescription prevented the imposition of a duty to warn on
pharmacists."° The Leesley court reasoned that imposing a duty to
warn would be "very burdensome" to pharmacists and that the
legislative policy of Illinois in 1988 opposed expanding the liability
of health professionals. 5
98. Id.

99. Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
100. Id.
101. Id. See also Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 392 (discussing the general policies
behind the learned intermediary rule). The policies behind the learned
intermediary rule suggested that prescription drugs proved a fathomable
exception to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) that requires
marketers of goods to warn users of the inherent dangers of a product. Id.

Prescription drugs should be an exception because they are complex and
require specialized knowledge to understand their effects. Id. The physician
has the capacity as a medical expert to determine what information is
applicable to a patient and accordingly to convey the applicable warning.

Id.

Since it is the physician that determines which drug should be prescribed to a
patient, and not the drug manufacturer, the patient should be warned by the
physician, not the drug manufacturer. Id. (citing Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498
F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974)).
102. Fakhouri v. Taylor, 618 N.E.2d 518, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
103. Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399, 402 (S.D. Ill. 1985); Leesley, 518

N.E.2d at 762-63 (stating that the imposition of a duty would be burdensome
to pharmacists).
104. Jones, 602 F. Supp at 402.

105. Leesley, 518 N.E.2d at 762-63. See Louis P. Milot, Tort Law - The
Manufacturer's and Pharmacist'sDuty to Warn Consumers of Risks and Side
Effects of PrescriptionDrugs. Leesley v. West, 165 Ill.App.3d 135, 518 N.E.2d
758 (2d Dist.1988), 13 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1003, 1011 (1989) (discussing policy
reasons used to support the no duty to warn rule in Leesley). The Leesley court

reasoned that "[tihe foreseeability of injury to an individual consumer in the
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C.

Other Approaches to the No Duty to Warn Rule

Although Illinois courts uphold the no duty to warn rule,
other jurisdictions hold that pharmacists may have a duty to
warn."
The jurisdictions holding that pharmacists may owe a
duty to warn reason that: (1) pharmacists should warn when they
have specific knowledge of a patient's predisposition, 10 7 (2) a duty
to warn is compelled by public policy and reason,'08 and (3)

absence of any particular warning also varies greatly depending on the
medical history and condition of the individual facts which we cannot
reasonably expect the pharmacist to know." 518 N.E.2d at 762. Additionally,
the court stated that "requiring [the pharmacy] to convey the warnings it
receives to its customers would be very burdensome." Id. Furthermore, the
court determined that "[mianufacturers of prescription drugs.., are not
required to provide cautionary information directly to the consumers of the
drugs. Imposing that burden on pharmacists, therefore, may well mean they
must bear the additional costs of reproducing the material they receive." Id.
at 763. The Leesley court concluded by stating that "[w]e simply decline to
subject pharmacists to liability for failure to give warnings which the
physician has not requested. We believe that this position is most consistent
with this State's legislative policy against expanding the liability risks of
health professionals." Id.
106. See Docken v. Ciba-Geigy, 739 P.2d 591, 593 (Or. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that the pharmacist "no duty" defense was another way of stating
that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was not a foreseeable risk of the
pharmacist's actions, and the court could not, as a matter of law, hold that the
harm suffered by the plaintiff was not foreseeable). See also David B.
Brushwood, The Pharmacist's Duty To Warn: Toward A Knowledge-Based
Model Of Professional Responsibility, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 32-42 (1991)
[hereinafter The Pharmacist'sDuty To Warn] (discussing pharmacist duty to
warn cases in the 1980s); Jill Casson Owen, The Pharmacist'sDuty To Warn:
Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 677, 679-88
(1995) (discussing the evolution of cases that hold both for and against the no
duty to warn rule). See also supra note 26 and accompanying text for a list of
jurisdictions that have held a pharmacist may have a duty to warn.
107. Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d. 121, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). The
court in Hand stated:
Here, [the defendant] knew that the decedent was alcoholic and knew,
or should have known, that the prescribed drugs were contraindicated
and, therefore, extremely dangerous to the well-being of its customer.
Clearly, under these circumstances, the dispensing druggist may have
had a duty to warn decedent of the grave danger involved and to inquire
of the prescribing doctors if such drugs should not be discontinued.
Id.
108. Riffv. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247, 1253-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
"In the instant case the testimony of the medical experts .... established that
the conduct of [the defendant's] pharmacists fell below the level of reasonable
conduct in the practice of pharmacy." Id. at 1253. The court further
explained:
If the consensus of the medical community is that a safety net of
overlapping responsibilities is necessary to serve the best interests of
patients, it is not for the judiciary to dismantle the safety net and leave
patients at the peril of one man's human frailty. Reason and public
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whether a pharmacist owes a duty to warn presents a genuine
issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.09
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Indiana provided one of the
most recent and thorough examinations of whether pharmacists
should have a duty to warn in Hooks v. McLaughlin. In Hooks,
the plaintiff sought treatment for a previous injury by obtaining a
prescription for drugs containing propoxyphene."' The plaintiff
became addicted to the propoxyphene and subsequently consumed
the drugs at almost two and a half times the prescribed dosage."'
The plaintiff sued the Hooks pharmacy claiming that the Hooks'
pharmacists should have refused to refill the prescription.'
Hooks filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that they

policy compel rejection of any attempt to apply indemnification
principles to the facts of the instant case.
Id. at 1253-54.
109. Docken, 739 P.2d at 593. "We cannot say as a matter of law that the
harm was not foreseeable or that the complaint fails to allege facts from which
a jury could find defendants negligent." Id. Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d
380, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). "[Wlhether the duty to warn of potential drug
interaction is included within the pharmacist's duty to his customer is a
disputed issue of fact preventing the granting of summary judgment." Id.
Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ind. 1994). "What
constitutes due care in a particular case will depend upon the circumstances of
that case, and will usually be a question of fact." Id.
110. 642 N.E.2d at 514.
111. Id. at 516. The plaintiff had previously treated his injury with
Darvocet and Darvon and became addicted to propoxyphene, the active
ingredient in those medications. Id. Darvon is a brand of Propoxyphene
PHYSICIANS' DESK
Hydrochloride manufactured by Eli Lilly & Co.
REFERENCE, supra note 5, at 1218. Propoxyphene is a "centrally acting
narcotic analgesic agent" that is indicated for relief of pain. Id. A warning
against Darvon indicates that Darvon should not be prescribed to patients
that are addiction-prone. Id. Darvocet is generally similar to Darvon with the
exception that Darvocet contains acetaminophen. Id. DARvOCET-N, DRUG
FACTS & COMPARISONS 244 (March 1995). The plaintiff was treated for
addiction in 1982, 1983, and 1987. Hooks, 642 N.E.2d at 516. In 1988, the
plaintiff resumed treatment for his back injury obtaining prescriptions for
drugs containing propoxyphene compounds. Id.
112. Hooks, 642 N.E.2d at 516. In one instance, the plaintiff refilled his
prescription twenty-four times in a sixty-day period for a total of 1,072 tablets.
Id. Those 1,072 tablets should have lasted the plaintiff 138 days, however the
plaintiff consumed them in sixty-two days. Id. The prescriptions were filled
twelve times in one month, resulting in either the plaintiff or his wife
appearing at the Hooks pharmacy for a prescription refill every two or three
days. Id. The prescribing physician refused to order any additional refills
after realizing the excessive rate at which the plaintiff was consuming the
drugs. Id. After the physician refused to order any more refills, the plaintiff
suffered depression and even threatened to kill himself with a shotgun. Id.
113. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the Hooks' pharmacists should have
refused to refill the prescription because they should have known that the
plaintiff was consuming the drugs at an excessive rate. Id.
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had no such duty.""
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial
of summary judgment stating that "[tihe relationship between
pharmacist and customer is a direct one based upon contract and
is independent of the relationship between physician and
patient.""'
The Hooks court concluded that the relationship
between a pharmacist and a customer is proximate enough to
justify imposing a duty."' Although the Hooks court stated that
the prescribing physician should warn the patient about drug side
effects, the court held that pharmacists have a duty to prevent
"the overuse and misuse of prescription drugs.""7 The Indiana
Supreme Court further held that "pharmacists must exercise that
degree of care that an ordinarily prudent pharmacist would under
the same or similar circumstances.""8
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held in Dooley v. Everett that
the no duty to warn rule should not apply in an action against a
pharmacist."'
In Dooley, a pharmacist simultaneously filled
Erythromycin and Theophylline prescriptions for a young child. 2 °
Upon filling the Erythromycin prescription, the pharmacist failed
to warn against the potential interaction between Erythromycin
and Theophylline."' As a result of the concurrent use of the drugs,
the child suffered cerebral seizures due to toxic levels of
Theophylline in his body."
The Dooley court held that
114. Id. The trial court denied the motion and upon an interlocutory appeal,
a majority of the Indiana Court of Appeals held that Hooks owed no duty,
reasoning that the imposition of such a duty "would undermine the physician-

patient relationship." Id.

115. Id. at 517. The court stated that "we do not perceive that physicians
and pharmacists will become adversaries if pharmacists are expected to cease
refilling prescriptions where the customers are using the drugs much more
rapidly than prescribed." Id. at 519.
116. Id. at 517. The court commented:
[ilt is a matter of common understanding that customers rely upon
pharmacists for [the pharmacist's] expertise. Upon this basis, we
conclude that the relationship between pharmacist and customer is
sufficiently close to justify imposing a duty ....
It is a matter of
common expectation ... that pharmacists possess expertise regarding
the dispensing of prescription drugs.

Id.
117. Hooks, 642 N.E.2d at 519.
118. Id.
119. 805 S.W.2d 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

120. Id. at 381.
treatment.

Id.

Theophylline is a prescription drug used for asthma
See also XANTHINE DERIVATIVES,

DRUG FACTS

&

COMPARISONS 178 (Feb. 1991) (stating the pharmacology of Theophylline and
other Xanthine Derivatives). Erythromycin is generally used for the
treatment of infections. ERYTHROMYCIN, DRUG FACTS & COMPARISONS 343

(Jan. 1992).
121. Dooley, 805 S.W.2d at 381.
122. Id.
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pharmacists have a duty to exercise the standard of care required
by the pharmacy profession in the pharmacist's community. 1 A
disputed question of fact concerning whether a duty to warn
against potential drug interactions existed, and therefore,
summary judgment (based on the no duty to warn rule) was
reversed.' 2'
D. Rebutting Support for the No Duty to Warn Rule
1.

The Physician-PatientRelationship

The relationship between a pharmacist and a customer may
be independent of the physician-patient relationship. The Indiana
Supreme Court supported this view in Hooks."5 The Hooks court
held that consumers commonly look to a pharmacist's expertise in
drugs when a prescription is filled. 16 Additionally, the court held
that pharmacists and physicians will not become adversaries if
pharmacists have a duty to warn, but instead, such a duty actually
21 7
may encourage pharmacists and physicians to work together.
The Hooks court also held that a pharmacist's duty to warn had no
effect on the previously established duties of a physician.'28
A pharmacist who warns a customer that alcohol should be
avoided while taking a drug, or other similar warnings, does not
require the pharmacist to know anything about a patient's medical
history. Such warnings may be appropriate based on knowledge of
the type of drug prescribed, and knowledge of the patient's medical
history is not necessary. The Illinois Pharmacists Association has
stated that a pharmacist counseling a patient on the side effects of
prescription drugs does not interfere with the physician-patient
relationship, but it actually compliments that relationship by
providing guidance to a patient on how to use a drug after a
123. Id. at 385.
124. Id. at 386.
125. Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 517 (Ind. 1994).
The Hooks court held that the relationship between the pharmacist and the
customer was based on privity of contract. Id. But see Rozny v. Marnul, 250
N.E.2d 656, 660 (Ill. 1969) (holding that tort liability in Illinois will no longer
be measured by privity, but by whether a defendant owes a duty to the
plaintiff).
126. 642 N.E.2d at 517.
127. Id. at 519. Additionally, the American Medical Association Policy H35.999 states that the "contribution of pharmacy as an independent profession
is assisting physicians toward the constant goal of improved patient care is
recognized and commended;... [t]he AMA urges physicians to encourage and
support the continued growth of pharmacy as a valuable and necessary
member of the health care team." The American Medical Association Policy
Finder H-35.999 Medicine And Pharmacy Relations, (visited July 29, 1999)
<http://www.amaassn.orglapps/pf-on.. .e&doc=policyfiles/HOD/H-.999HTM>.
128. Hooks, 642 N.E.2d at 519.
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physician determines which drug the patient should use.'29
Pharmacists who warn patients actually increase the patient's
awareness and interest in their drug therapy.'
This heightened
awareness in their drug therapy may positively impact the
physician-patient relationship.'
2.

The Learned IntermediaryRule

A Tennessee Appellate Court weighed the learned
intermediary rule while discussing whether a pharmacist should
have a duty to warn in Dooley."' The Dooley court determined
that the Tennessee legislature adopted the learned intermediary
rule as an exception to the manufacturer's duty to warn in strict
liability cases. ' The court decided that the issue of whether a
pharmacist owes a duty only involves the pharmacist-customer
relationship, and the drug manufacturer is not relevant."
The
court further held that the defenses available to a drug
manufacturer in a strict liability suit are not applicable in a
pharmacist's duty to warn case."'
Mr. David Brushwood, a noted authority on the topic of
pharmacist liability, discussed the misapplication of the learned
intermediary rule to pharmacist duty to warn cases. 3 6
Mr.
Brushwood points out that the learned intermediary rule is a
defense used by drug manufacturers, and not a doctrine to
determine whether liability exists."7 The logic behind allowing
drug manufacturers to pass their duty to warn onto the
prescribing physician is that the physician is more proximate to
129. Memorandum Amicus Curiae of The Illinois Pharmacists Association at
11, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp. 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992) (No. 72908).
130. DAVID B. BRUSHWOOD, PHARMACY MALPRACTICE LAW AND
REGULATION § 8.11 at 259 (2d ed. 1998).
131. Id.
132. 805 S.W.2d 380, 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
133. Id. at 386.
134. Id.
135. Id. See also Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 434 (Tenn. 1994)
(holding that the Court of Appeals in Dooley properly rejected the learned
intermediary rule as a defense where the pharmacist failed to warn a
customer of a possible drug interaction between two drugs prescribed by the
same physician).
136. BRUSHWOOD, supra note 130, § 8.3, at 242. Other works by Mr.
Brushwood include: RICHARD R. ABOOD & DAVID B. BRUSHWOOD, PHARMACY
PRACTICE AND THE LAw (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter ABOOD & BRUSHWOOD, 2d
ed. 1997]; David B. Brushwood, The Pharmacist's Duty Under OBRA-90
Standards, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 475 (1997) [hereinafter The Pharmacist'sDuty
Under OBRA-90 Standards]; RICHARD

R. ABOOD & DAVID B. BRUSHWOOD,

PHARMACY PRACTICE AND THE LAw (1994); The Pharmacist'sDuty To Warn,
supra note 106, at 1; DAVID B. BRUSHWOOD, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
PHARMACY LAW

(1986).

137. BRUSHWOOD, supra note 130, § 8.3, at 244.
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the patient than the manufacturer and thus better able to warn.'m
However, Mr. Brushwood argues that this logic should not exempt
the pharmacist because the pharmacist is arguably more
proximate to the patient than the physician."9
The Illinois Pharmacists Association (IPhA) has argued a
practical approach for not extending the learned intermediary rule
to pharmacists. 41
The IPhA argues that "[rlealistically, the
pharmacist knows as much, and generally more, about a drug's
propensities than the prescribing physician . ...

"1'

The National

Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) has advocated that
extending the learned intermediary rule to pharmacists would
effectively "sanction the sealing of the pharmacist's lips."
Additionally the NABP has stated that extending the rule to
pharmacists would grant pharmacists a "blanket immunity,
sanctioning silence when public safety demands the pharmacist to
speak. " "
3. "PublicPolicy" JustificationsAgainst the No Duty to Warn
Rule
In Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, a plaintiff brought an action

against a pharmacy for failing to warn of the dangers of a
prescription suppository from which she suffered toxic effects,
causing permanent damage to her foot.'" The Riff court held that
public policy requires that pharmacists be accountable for failing
to exercise care with respect to the harm involved.'" The Hooks
court stated that a societal interest in preventing the use and
misuse of prescription drugs would be furthered by recognizing
that pharmacists may have a duty to warn.141

138. Id.
139. Id.

140. Memorandum Amicus Curiae of The Illinois Pharmacists Association at
10, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp. 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill.
1992) (No. 72908).

141. Id. See infra note 237 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
differences in pharmaceutical education requirements between physicians and
pharmacists.
142. Memorandum Amicus Curiae of The National Association of Boards of
Pharmacy at 31, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp. 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill.
1992) (No.
72908).
143. Id.
144. 508 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).

145. Id. at 1251. The court stated "pharmacists who prepare and dispense

drugs and medicines for use in the human body must be held responsible for
the failure to exercise the degree of care and vigilance commensurate with the
harm which would be likely to result from relaxing it." Id.
146. Hooks v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ind.1994).
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE No DUTY To WARN RULE: GOING BEYOND THE
PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS

This Part provides an analysis of the no duty to warn rule in
Illinois. Section A will discuss the no duty to warn rule in

conjunction with the common law of Illinois. Section B will
discuss the no duty to warn rule in conjunction with state and
federal statutory considerations. Finally, Section C will discuss
the no duty to warn rule and the profession of pharmacy.
A. Searchingfor Guidance from Illinois Common Law
1.

The Duty Analysis

To assert that a pharmacist has a duty to warn, a plaintiff
must file an action against a pharmacist for negligence. 47 A
negligence action in Illinois must set forth the existence of a duty
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, a subsequent breach of that
duty, and an injury to the plaintiff that was proximately caused by
the defendant's breach of the duty owed." Therefore, in order for
a plaintiff to sustain an action against a defendant for negligence,
the plaintiff must first prove that the defendant owes the plaintiff
a duty, and then prove that the defendant breached that duty by
failing to conform to the applicable standard of care. 49 The no
duty to warn rule effectively precludes any plaintiff from
successfully asserting a negligence claim based on a pharmacist
failing to warn of any danger regarding a prescription drug."u
With the blanket no duty to warn rule, courts may hold that no
duty exists (and therefore no action for negligence) without any
inquiry into the relationship between the parties, or the applicable
147. See Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, 562 N.E.2d 967, 968 (Inl. 1990)
(discussing the requirements for a negligence action in Illinois).
148. Id. In Widlowski, the defendant's employee bit off a portion of a nurse's
finger while the nurse was treating the employee for his injuries related to a
work accident. Id. The nurse filed a complaint alleging that the defendant
employer and employee were both negligent for allowing the employee to be
exposed to nitrogen gas that caused the employee to become ill and eventually
bite off part of the plaintiffs finger. Id.
149. Id. at 970. The Widlowski court held that the defendant owed no duty
to the plaintiff and therefore the trial court correctly granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss. Id.
150. See e.g., Fakhouri v. Taylor, 618 N.E.2d 518, 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)

(holding that pharmacists do not have a duty to warn a customer that a drug
prescription amount exceeded the manufacturer's recommended dosages);
Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 759 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that

pharmacists have no duty to warn a customer of the potential hazards of
prescription drugs); Eldridge, 485 N.E.2d 551, 554-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
(holding that pharmacists have no common law duty to warn a physician that
a drug is being prescribed in dangerous amounts and therefore the court
properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss).
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standard of care of the pharmacist. 151
The no duty to warn rule exposes a fundamental question whether it is proper for courts to hold that no duty exists without
inquiring into the relationship between the parties. If Illinois
common law allows the existence of a duty to be determined
without an inquiry into the relationship between the parties, then
the no duty to warn rule may be consistent with Illinois common
law. However, if Illinois common law requires some inquiry before
dispelling the existence of a duty, then the no duty to warn rule is
inconsistent with Illinois common law.
Whether a duty exists is a question of law." 2 Thus, the
Eldridge, Leesley, and Fakhouri courts were within their authority
in determining that pharmacists owe no duty to warn."' However,
courts should not dispel the existence of a duty before determining
whether the risk of harm to the plaintiff would be reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant - the "foreseeability factor."'" To
determine whether a duty exists, a court should inquire "whether
the defendant and the plaintiff stood in such a relationship to one
another where the defendant is obliged to conform to a standard of
conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff" - the "relationship
factor.""' In determining liability for failing to take steps to
prevent harm to others, a court should look for a relationship
between the parties that justifies imposing a duty. 6
151. If the plaintiff cannot place a duty on the pharmacist because of the no
duty to warn rule, the plaintiffs action will fail due to the lack of an essential
element of a negligence action.
152. Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968.
153. Fakhouri, 618 N.E.2d at 519; Leesley, 518 N.E.2d at 759; Eldridge, 485
N.E.2d at 554-55.
154. Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968. The Widlowski court stated "in
determining whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, the court will
consider whether the risk of harm to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable."
Id. See Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 517 (Ind. 1994)
(discussing that a duty should only be imposed when a "reasonably foreseeable
victim" is injured by a "reasonably foreseeable harm"); Pittman v. Upjohn Co.,
890 S.W.2d 425, 435 (Tenn. 1994) (holding that a pharmacy was not liable to a
plaintiff because the plaintiff failed to show that his injury was reasonably
foreseeable to the pharmacy, and as a result, the pharmacy's duty to warn did
not extend to the plaintiff); ABOOD & BRUSHWOOD, 2d ed. 1997, supra note
136, at 266 (discussing the foreseeability factor used in the Hooks decision,
that is, whether it is foreseeable that a pharmacist's customer may be injured
by a prescription drug).
155. Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968. See also ABOOD & BRUSHWOOD, 2d ed.
1997, supra note 136, at 265-66 (discussing the relationship factor used in the
Hooks decision, that is, what type of relationship existed between the
pharmacist and the customer in Hooks); KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 53,
at 356 (stating that a "duty is a question of whether the defendant is under
any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff').
156. KEETON, supra note 22, § 53, at 373-74. For nonfeasance liability, "it is
necessary to find some definite relation between the parties, of such a
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Furthermore, when deciding whether a duty exists, a court should
examine the likelihood of an injury to the plaintiff, and the extent
of the 1burden
to be placed on the defendant - the "likelihood
57
factor."

The Eldridge, Leesley, and Fakhouri courts apparently failed
to use the Illinois common law factors discussed above to
determine if pharmacists should have a duty. The Eldridge court
based its holding that pharmacists have no duty to warn because
of: (1) prior decisions of other jurisdictions, and (2) the physician's
duty to warn under the learned intermediary rule.'58 The Leesley
court briefly discussed the ability of pharmacists to foresee an
injury to a customer, but ultimately held that pharmacists have no
duty to warn based upon the physician's duty under the learned
intermediary rule.159 The Fakhouri court decided not to impose a
duty to warn on pharmacists on the basis of: (1) the Eldridge and
Leesley decisions, (2) the physician's duty under the learned
intermediary rule, and (3) a fear that imposing a duty on
pharmacists would interfere with the physician-patient
relationship.6 '
The Eldridge and Fakhouri courts did not discuss the
forseeability factor. 6 ' Additionally, the Eldridge, Leesley, and
Fakhouri courts did not inquire into the relationship factor.' 6'
Finally, the Eldridge, Leesley, and Fakhouri courts did not discuss
the likelihood factor in determining if the pharmacist should owe a
duty to warn.
While the existence of a duty is a question of law, Illinois law
does require a court to discuss the foreseeability, relationship, and
likelihood factors before determining whether a duty exists."'4 The
Eldridge, Leesley, and Fakhouri courts erred by not determining
whether pharmacists should have a duty by analyzing the
foreseeability, relationship, and likelihood factors. 6 ' The no duty
to warn rule violates Illinois common law precisely because the
rule prevents the consideration of these factors as outlined by the
character that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act." Id.
157. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 396 (Ill.

1987).
158. 485 N.E.2d 551, 552-53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
159. 518 N.E.2d 758, 762-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
160. 618 N.E.2d 518, 519-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
161. See Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, 562 N.E.2d 967, 968 (Ill. 1990)

(discussing the foreseeability factor).
162. See id. (discussing the relationship factor).
163. See Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 396 (discussing the likelihood factor).

164. Id.; Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968.
165. Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 396; Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968. Since the
Illinois Supreme Court has outlined the factors a court should consider when

determining if a duty exists, it appears that the Eldridge, Leesley, and
Fakhouricourts erred by not following those common law rules.
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Illinois Supreme Court." Additionally, the no duty to warn rule
and Illinois common law are inconsistent because of the Illinois
rule that creates a duty to warn when a defendant possesses
unequal knowledge over a plaintiff, and the defendant is aware
that harm might occur if no warning is given.167 Pharmacists
certainly have a greater knowledge about prescription drugs than
their customers. The foregoing analysis of Illinois common law
has shown that the pharmacist's no duty to warn rule is
fundamentally unsound because it fails to allow courts to properly
inquire whether a duty should exist.
2.

Standardof CareAnalysis

The relationship between the no duty to warn rule and the
pharmacist's requisite standard of conduct further illustrates the
rule's incompatibility with Illinois common law. A duty requires a
person to conform to a particular standard."
The Illinois
Pharmacy Act declared the profession of pharmacy a professional
practice in the State of Illinois.169 Illinois courts hold professionals
to a professional standard of care determined by comparing the
conduct of the defendant to the conduct of a reasonably prudent
member of the same profession acting in a factually similar
situation.170
Therefore, Illinois pharmacists have a duty to
conform to a professional standard of care, and courts should
determine whether a pharmacist has breached that standard of
care by comparing actions to those of a reasonably prudent
pharmacist in the same factual situation.17 1 However, since this
166. Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968; Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
167. Proctor v. UpJohn, 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). "A duty
to warn exists only when there is 'unequal knowledge and the defendant,
possessed of such knowledge, knows or should know that harm might occur if
no warning is given.'" Id. at 1211.
168. See Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968 (stating that "[a] duty requires a
person to conform to a certain standard of conduct").
169. The Pharmacy Practice Act of 1987, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/1 (West
1996). The practice of pharmacy in Illinois is a professional practice "affecting
the public health, safety and welfare and is subject to regulation and control
in the public interest." Id.
170. Advincula v. United Blood Serv., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1020 (Ill. 1996). See
also Pittman v. Upjohn, 890 S.W.2d 425, 434 (Tenn. 1994) (holding that
pharmacists have a duty to exercise the standard of care that is required by
the pharmacy profession in the same or similar communities in which the
pharmacist practices); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965)
(discussing the standard of conduct applicable to professionals).
171. See generally Tara L. Furnish, ProfessionalMalpractice,Departingfrom
the TraditionalNo Duty to Warn: A New Trend for PharmacyMalpractice?, 21
AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 199 (1997) (discussing the trends of professional
pharmacy malpractice, including case citations for jurisdictions both imposing

and not imposing the no duty to warn rule, as well as citations to legal
periodicals discussing this subject).
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rule places no duty to warn on pharmacists, the rule effectively
allows a pharmacist to act below the required professional
standard of care, and avoid liability for negligence.'72
The relationship between the standard of care and duty is
complex. 7' According to Prosserand Keeton on the Law of Torts:
[the term "duty" should be used] for the problem of the relation
between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for
the benefit of the other, and to deal with particular conduct in terms
of a legal standard of what is required to meet the obligation. In
other words, "duty" is a question of whether the defendant is under
any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in
negligence cases, the duty is always the same - to conform to the
legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent
risk ... [t]he distinction [between duty and the standard of care] is
one of convenience only, and it must be remembered that the two
are correlative, and one cannot exist without the other.17
"A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation
... to conform to a particular standard of conduct." 7' Because
Illinois has a standard of conduct required of professionals, those
professionals have a duty to conform to that standard. 176 The
analysis of Illinois common law indicates that it is inconsistent to
have both a pharmacist no duty to warn rule and a pharmacist's
duty to conform to the professional pharmacy standard of care.
The no duty to warn rule actually prevents pharmacists from
having a duty to warn even when the professional pharmacist
standard of care would require a warning. In short, this rule
eliminates a duty that may otherwise be required by the
professional pharmacist standard of care. For example, if a
reasonable and prudent pharmacist provides a warning in a given
situation, a pharmacist that does not provide a warning in that
situation has breached the professional pharmacist standard of
care, but not the no duty to warn rule. 77 The standard of care
172. In a situation where a reasonable and prudent pharmacist would warn
a customer not to drink alcohol with a certain drug, a pharmacist failing to
warn a customer is thereby acting below the standard of a reasonably prudent
pharmacist, but is not negligent because there was no duty to warn.
173. See, e.g., Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, 880 P.2d 1129,
1132 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the Arizona Supreme Court has
cautioned lower courts against juxtaposing the standards of care and duty).
174. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 356.
175. Id.
176. See Advincula, 678 N.E.2d at 1020 (stating that all Illinois
professionals "must use the same degree of knowledge, skill and ability as an
ordinarily careful professional would exercise under similar circumstances").
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6(6) (Proposed Final Draft 1997)
(discussing liability for inadequate warnings).
§ 6 Liability of Seller or other Distributor for Harm Caused by Defective
Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices ....
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analysis of Illinois common law further shows that the
pharmacist's no duty to warn rule is inappropriate because the
rule undermines the standard of care required of pharmacists.
B. Statutory Considerations
Both federal and state legislation address the duties of
pharmacists.t
In 1990, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (OBRA-90) intending, inter alia, to increase the
quality and efficiency of the Medicaid prescription program and
improve the quality of pharmaceutical care that Medicaid patients
receive.'
Another purpose of OBRA-90 is to help pharmacists and
physicians reduce drug interactions and adverse reactions to
prescription drugs."
One of the OBRA-90 requirements for a
(b) For purposes of liability... a prescription drug or medical device is
defective if at the time of sale ... the drug ....
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings...
(d) A prescription drug ... is not reasonably safe because of inadequate
instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings
regarding the foreseeable harm are not provided to:...
prescribing and other health care professionals who are in a position to
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or
warnings ....
(e) A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription drug or medical
device is subject to liability for harm caused by the drug or device if:...
at or before the time of sale or other distribution of the drug or medical
device the retail seller or other distributor fails to exercise reasonable
care and such failure causes harm to persons.
Id.
ABC Pharmaceuticals manufactures and distributes a prescription drug
to reduce blood pressure. ABC supplies pharmacies with pamphlets
explaining the risks and warning patients against drinking alcohol
while taking the drug. ABC asks the pharmacies to give the pamphlets
to patients when dispensing the drug. The P Pharmacy received the
pamphlets but negligently failed to give them to patients. P is subject to
liability to those patients suffering injury for whom the pamphlets
would have been effective in avoiding risks of usage.
Id. § 6 cmt. h, illus. 4.
178. See The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA-90), 42
U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (1990), for an example of a federal statute addressing
pharmacists, and The Pharmacy Practice Act for an Illinois statute discussing
pharmacists' duties in Illinois. See also ILLINOIS PHARMACISTS ASSOCIATION,
ILLINOIS PHARMACY LAw MANUAL (3d ed. 1995) (presenting a comprehensive
collection of Illinois laws that are applicable to pharmacists).
179. John C. West & David E. Smith, A Prescription For Liability: The
Pharmacy Mandate of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 and Its
Impact Upon Pharmacists'Common Law Duties, 2 J. PHARMACY & L. 127,
128-30 (1994) (discussing the dual purpose of OBRA-90).
See The
Pharmacist's Duty Under OBRA-90 Standards, supra note 136, at 475
(discussing OBRA-90 and pharmaceutical care).
180. OBRA-90 requires states to implement drug use review programs
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state to receive federal Medicaid funds is that each state must
implement drug use review (DUR) programs." The DUR requires
that a pharmacist must offer to discuss with each Medicaid
patient matters that the pharmacist believes are significant,
including the prescription drug's side effects, possible interactions,
and special precautions for the administration to and use by a
patient. 8 Congress intended pharmacists to take an active role in
a patient's drug use and utilize their professional knowledge and
judgment to help ensure that a patient's drug use is safe and
effective.1"
The Illinois legislature passed the Pharmacy Practice Act
(PPA) in 1987.18 The PPA declares the practice of pharmacy in
Illinois a professional practice." The PPA also declares that the
practice of pharmacy is a practice affecting the health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens of Illinois." The PPA further states that
the practice of pharmacy should be controlled and regulated
according to the "public interest."87 The PPA defines the practice
of pharmacy as the care given to patients which may include
designed to reduce adverse reactions to drugs and drug interactions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r-8(g)(1)(A). See also infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the drug use review programs.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(A). "In order to meet the requirement of
section 1396b(i)(10)(B) ... a State shall provide, by no later than January 1,
1993, for a drug use review program... for covered outpatient drugs in order
to assure that prescriptions (i) are appropriate, (ii) are medically necessary,
and (iii) are not likely to result in adverse medical results." Id. See The
Pharmacist's Duty Under OBRA-90 Standards, supra note 136, at 487-92
(discussing the OBRA-90 drug use review system and its impact on
pharmacists' duties).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(2)(A)(I). The statute further states:
The pharmacist must offer to discuss.., matters which in the exercise
of the pharmacist's professional judgment ... the pharmacist deems
significant including the following... (cc) Special directions and
precautions for preparation, administration and use by the patient...
(dd) Common severe side or adverse effects or interactions and
therapeutic contraindications that may be encountered, including their
avoidance, and the action required if they occur.
Id. See also West & Smith, supra note 179, at 129-32 (1994) for a discussion
of OBRA-90's DUR's.
183. See supra note 182 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
pharmacist's active role in patient's drug use. See also Gary G. Cacciatore,
Computers, OBRA 90 and the Pharmacist'sDuty to Warn, 5 J. PHARMACY & L.
103, 110-13 (1996) (discussing the impact of OBRA-90 on pharmacists);
Richard Hight Gastineau, Drug Therapy Counseling: Whose Duty to Warn?, 2
J. PHARMACY & L. 293, 311-22 (1994) (discussing the impact of OBRA-90 on
pharmacist's responsibilities).
184. The Pharmacy Practice Act of 1987, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/1 (West
1996).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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providing information on drug interactions and side effects. 1 8 The
PPA further maintains that it should be "liberally construed" to
carry out its objectives and purposes. 8 9 Not only does the PPA
suggest that pharmacists should warn, but it also states that its
provisions should be liberally construed to help promote the
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Illinois.' 1
The no duty to warn rule is inconsistent with the PPA's goals
of promoting public health, safety, and welfare because the rule
precludes pharmacists from ever having a duty that would
promote those goals.'9' The no duty to warn rule is not only
inconsistent with the PPA's definition of the practice of pharmacy,
it is by no means a liberal construction of that definition.' 9
188. Id. § 3(d).
"'Practice of pharmacy' means the provision of
pharmaceutical care to patients which may include, but is not limited to, (1)
patient counseling ...(3) providing information on the therapeutic values,
reactions, drug interactions, side effects, uses, selection of medications and
medical devices, and outcome of drug therapy." Id. Patient counseling is

defined as the pharmacist or the pharmacist's designee offering to counsel. Id.
§ 3(r). The following includes the National Association of Boards of
Pharmacy's 1996-1997 list of states that require counseling for new
prescriptions: Ala.; Alaska; Ariz.; Ark.; Cal. when a patient is present in the
pharmacy; Conn.; Del.; Fla. - only an offer to counsel is required; Ga.; Haw. OBRA-90 requirements; Idaho - when applicable/appropriate; Ill. - only an
offer to counsel is required; Ind. - only an offer to counsel is required; Iowa;
Kan.; Ky.; La. - unless deemed inappropriate; Me.; Md.; Mass.; Minn.; Miss. when applicable/appropriate; Mo.; Mont.; Neb.; Nev.; N.H.; N.J.; N.M.; N.Y.;
N.C. - must be made by pharmacist or pharmacist intern/extern; N.D.; Ohio;
Okla. - pharmacist may use professional judgment; Or.; Pa.; R.I.; S.C.; S.D.;
Tenn.; Tex.; Utah; Vt.; Va.; Wash.; W. Va. - only an offer to counsel is
required; Wis.; and Wyo. NAT'L ASSOC. OF BOARDS OF PHARMACY, SURVEY OF
PHARMACY LAW 1996-1997 62-63 (1996). Colorado is the only state that does
not require patient counseling for new prescriptions. Id. The following
includes the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy's 1996-1997 list of
the states that require patient counseling for prescriptions for non-Medicare
patients: Ala.; Alaska; Ariz.; Ark.; Cal. - when a patient is present in the
pharmacy; Del.; Fla. - only an offer to counsel is required; Ga.; Idaho; Ill. only an offer to counsel is required; Ind. - only an offer to counsel is required;
Iowa; Kan.; Ky.; La.; Me.; Mass. - only an offer to counsel is required; Miss.;
Mo.; Mont.; Neb.; Nev.; N.H.; N.M.; N.Y.; N.C.; N.D.; Ohio; Okla. - yes, when
applicable/appropriate; Or.; Pa.; R.I. S.D.; Tenn.; Tex.; Utah; Vt.; Va.; Wash.;
W. Va. - only an offer to counsel is required; Wis.; and Wyo. Id. The states
that do not require patient counseling for prescriptions for non-Medicare
patients are: Colo.; Conn.; Haw.; Md.; Minn.; S.C.; and Wyo. Id.
189. The Pharmacy Practice Act § 1.
190. Id.
191. Id. The public health, safety, and welfare are not promoted by a rule
that does not impose upon a professional, who knows more about prescription
drugs than any other professional, a duty to warn of a drug's dangerousness.
Id. Such a rule actually jeopardizes the public health, safety, and welfare. Id.
192. Id. § 3(d). The PPA's definition of the practice of pharmacy states that
pharmaceutical care "may include, but is not limited to" providing information
on drug interactions and side effects. Id. Reading the definition more
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Additionally, a rule that precludes a highly educated, state
licensed, professional pharmacist from ever having a duty to warn
a customer of the possible adverse effects of a drug violates the
"public interest."93
C. PharmacyProfession

The American Pharmaceutical Association (APhA) has stated
that "[tihe mission of pharmacy is to serve society as the
profession responsible for the appropriate use of medications,
devices, and services to achieve optimal therapeutic outcomes."'"
The APhA has further stated that the phrase "optimal therapeutic
outcomes" declares that the profession of pharmacy's ultimate goal
is to promote public health, and the practice of pharmacy "accepts
the attendant liabilities associated with medication use." 9" Both
the Illinois Pharmacists Association and the National Association
of Boards of Pharmacy express similar views on the roles of
pharmacists."

In a memorandum amicus curiae to the Illinois Supreme
Court, the Illinois Pharmacists Association (IPhA) suggested that
the no duty to warn rule as applied to pharmacists was
inconsistent with the practice of pharmacy.'97 The IPhA requested
that the Court define a pharmacist's duty by recognizing
pharmacists as professionals, and establishing the duties of a
pharmacist consistent with the duties of a professional.'
The
IPhA also asserted that:
imposing upon the pharmacy profession the same duty as that owed
by other professionals practicing their professions, this Court
reconciles common law with state and federal legislation,
encourages pharmacists to disseminate valuable information,
increases the likelihood of patient compliance with drug therapy,
liberally would not promote a pharmacist's no duty to warn. Id.
193. See id. §§ 6-8 (discussing the licensing of Illinois pharmacists). See also

id. § 1 ("It is further declared to be a matter of public interest and concern
that the practice of pharmacy... merit and receive the confidence of the
public."). It should be noted that the Illinois Pharmacists Association had
substantial impact on The Pharmacy Practice Act. See H.R. 1432, 85th Gen.
Assembly, 52nd Legis. Day, 176-77 (Ill. 1987) (discussing the adoption of the
Bill pending an amendment reflecting the agreements made with the IPhA).
194. Supplemental Memorandum Amicus Curiae of the Illinois Pharmacists
Association app. 2, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992)
(No. 72908).
195. Id.
196. See the discussion of Frye, supra notes 59-72 (discussing the IPhA and
the NABP's arguments to the Illinois Supreme Court).
197. Supplemental Memorandum Amicus Curiae of the Illinois Pharmacists
Association at 9, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992)
(No. 72908).
198. Id.
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and reduces health care costs.'"
Not only is the IPhA advocating the elimination of the no
duty to warn rule, it points out how inharmonious the rule is with
the profession of pharmacy itself.
The National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) has
also advocated the elimination of the no duty to warn rule. In an
amicus brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, the NABP requested
the Court to conclude that pharmacists should have a duty to
warn.2" The NABP stated that to conclude otherwise would ignore
the intent and language of the PPA thereby placing the public
health and welfare at risk.2 1' The NABP asserted that the PPA's
legislative declaration, definition of "practice of pharmacy," and
the definition of "dispense," by their language alone, impose a duty
to warn on pharmacists. 2 Furthermore, the NABP asserted that
excusing pharmacists from a duty to warn causes pharmacists to
ignore their education, professional training, and the standards of
practice established by the pharmacy profession.2 3 The NABP's
position on the elimination of the no duty to warn rule is
compatible with the IPhA.2 ' Not only does the NABP advocate the
elimination of the no duty to warn rule, it argues that the rule is
inconsistent with the language of the PPA and the standards of
practice established by the pharmacy profession.0 5
Consumers spend twelve to thirteen billion dollars a year on
prescription medication."°
Astonishingly, researchers estimate

199. Id. at 11-12.
200. BriefAmicus Curiae of the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy
at 34, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992) (No. 72908).
201. Id. at 16.
202. Id. at 6-9.
203. Id. at 16.
204. Supplemental Memorandum Amicus Curiae of the Illinois Pharmacists
Association at 9-12, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992)
(No. 72908).
205. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy
at 16, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992) (No. 72908).
206. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ET AL., AN

INTRODUCTION TO FDA DRUG REGULATION A MANUAL FOR PHARMACISTS 41
(1995). See also The National Consumers League, Press Release (visited Nov.
21, 1998) <http://www.nclnet.org/foodanddrug.html>(discussing reliance on
prescription drugs).
Americans rely heavily on prescription medicines to maintain good
health making the issue of interactions between prescription drugs and
certain foods of increasing importance . . . . [tihe National Consumers
League is publishing a brochure to alert consumers to possible drug
interactions. 'Approximately 85 million American adults take one or
more prescription medicines,' said Linda Golodner, president of the
National Consumers League. 'Yet, despite this widespread use, many
consumers do not know about potential risks, side effects and possible'
drug interactions'. . . . [tihe effects of drug interactions can range from
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that up to one-half of patients are consuming their medication
incorrectly.0 7
Amid concern over the misuse of prescription
medication, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and several
other organizations founded the National Council on Patient
Information and Education (NCPIE). 2°'

NCPIE constructed five

questions that patients should ask their physicians and their
pharmacists..2 " Among these questions are: (1) will there be any
21 °
side effects?, and (2) should I avoid any other drugs?
Additionally, the FDA states that pharmacists can provide
comprehensive information about drug interactions, side effects,
and precautions; and pharmacists should make themselves
available to provide basic information regarding prescriptions.21 '
The no duty to warn rule also disrupts the education of
pharmacists. The disparity between the judicial system rulings
and the pharmacy profession's views on a pharmacist's duty to
warn creates difficulty for pharmacy professors torn between
teaching the profession's view or the court's view of pharmacist
duties.212 Pharmacy students study the "imperatives of warning
patients of risks of irrational drug use and of possible adverse
reactions" for several years only to be confused by judicial
decisions that hold pharmacists have no duty to warn patients. 213
mild to severe and may include weakness, fatigue, muscle aches and

rash. In addition, the effects of food and drug interactions can often be
confused with common medical problems such as arthritis pain or a cold
or flu.
Id.
207. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ET AL., supra note

206, at 41.
208. Id.
209. Id. "The five questions are: (1) What is the name of the drug and what
is it supposed to do? (2) When do I take it and how much? (3) How should I
take it and for how long? (4) Will there be any side effects? (5) Should I avoid
any foods, activities, or other drugs?" Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Paul G. Grussing, A Comparison of Empirical Studies of Pharmacy
Practicewith JudicialDescriptions,44 DRAKE L. REV. 483, 484 (1996).
213. Id. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES OF PHARMACY, OATH OF
A PHARMACIST (declaring a pharmacist's devotion to the profession of
pharmacy). The following is the oath that pharmacists traditionally take upon
graduation:
At this time, I vow to devote my professional life to the service of all
humankind through the profession of pharmacy. I will consider the
welfare of humanity and relief of human suffering my primary concerns.
I will apply my knowledge, experience, and skills to the best of my
ability to assure optimal drug therapy outcomes for the patients I serve.
I will keep abreast of developments and maintain professional
competency in my profession of pharmacy. I will maintain the highest
principles of moral, ethical, and legal conduct. I will embrace and
advocate change in the profession of pharmacy that improves patient
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Despite the no duty to warn rule, pharmacists continue to expand
their
educational
training and superior pharmaceutical
knowledge,
recognizing that the increasing number of
prescriptions dispensed increase the possibility of prescription
drug injuries.214
The above analysis illustrates that the pharmacist's no duty
to warn rule is inconsistent with: (1) Illinois common law
principles of duty and standard of care,215 (2) federal and state
statutory provisions,2e and (3) the pharmacy profession. 17
III. PROPOSING THE ELIMINATION OF THE PHARMACIST'S No DUTY
To WARN RULE IN ILLINOIS

This Part proposes the elimination of the pharmacist's no

care. I take these vows voluntarily with the full realization of the
responsibility with which I am entrusted by the public.
Id.
214. Michael J. Holleran R.Ph., The PharmaceuticalAccess and Prudent
Purchasing Act of 1990: Federal Law Shifts the Duty to Warn from the
Physician to the Pharmacist, 26 AKRON L. REV. 77, 85 (1992). See The
Pharmacist's Duty To Warn, supra note 106, at 503 (stating that
"[piharmacists' knowledge of drugs surpasses that of any other health
professional.").
Pharmacists continue their education through various
professional services that episodically provide them with updates on recent

developments in the pharmacy profession. One such service is PHARMACIST'S
LETTER (LETTER). In July 1998, LETTER informed pharmacists that Posicor
was being removed from the market due to drug interactions.
Drug
Interactions, PHARMAcIsT's LETTER (Therapeutic Research Center, Stockton,
Cal.) July 1998, at 37. The July 1998 LETTER also warned pharmacists

against a combination of Viagra and nitrates. Id. A September 1997 LETTER
instructed pharmacists to be aware of drug interactions and the order in
which multiple drugs are given. Drug Interaction, PHARMACIST'S LETTER
(Therapeutic Research Center, Stockton, Cal.) Sept. 1997, at 53-54. In an
August 1997 LETTER, pharmacists were warned to watch for drug interactions
with Posicor, a new calcium blocker for hypertension.
Cardiology,
PHARMACIST'S LETTER (Therapeutic Research Center, Stockton, Cal.) Aug.
1997, at 45. The LETTER instructed pharmacists to "[mlake sure patients
DON'T take posicor with Seldane... Hismanal... or Propulsid... because of
the risk of arrhythmias." Id. The Letter also warned pharmacists that
"[s]ome other drugs can be taken with Posicor, but they might need to be given
in LOWER doses." Id. See also infra note 237 and accompanying text for an
example of the differences in pharmacy related educational requirements
between physicians and pharmacists.

215. See Part II (A)l and (A)2 of this Comment for a discussion of the no
duty to warn rule and Illinois common law principles.
216. See Part II (B) of this Comment for a discussion of the inconsistencies

between the no duty to warn rule and state and federal statutory provisions.
217. See Part II (C) of this Comment for a discussion of the profession of
pharmacy's reaction to the no duty to warn rule. See also The Pharmacist's
Duty To Warn, supra note 106, at 54 (stating that reliance on professional
standards as the predecessor to legal standards is appealing because it is hard
to argue that anyone knows pharmacists as well as they know themselves).
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duty to warn rule in Illinois.218 Illinois should eliminate the
pharmacist's no duty to warn rule because, as this Comment has
illustrated, the no duty to warn rule is inconsistent with Illinois
common law,219 state and federal legislation," ° and the profession
of pharmacy."l In addition to the aforementioned deficiencies,
another justification for eliminating the no duty to warn rule is

that the rule is completely unnecessary.

Ironically, the

pharmacist no duty to warn rule should be eliminated because
Illinois pharmacists do not have a duty to warn.
Illinois
pharmacists have a duty to conform to the professional pharmacist
standard of care.'m Therefore, a failure to warn is only relevant if
the professional pharmacist standard of care requires a warning.
Then, the failure to warn is only relevant because the professional
pharmacist standard of care has been breached. 23 To determine if
a duty has been breached, Illinois courts should only look to
whether the pharmacist's conduct has breached the duty to
conform to the professional pharmacist standard of care.' 4

However, eliminating the no duty to warn rule would not be
tantamount to imposing a duty to warn in all circumstances. If
courts eliminate the no duty to warn rule, a pharmacist would
only be obligated to warn in situations where the professional
pharmacist standard of care would be breached by not giving a
warning.
A

Judicial Solution

The next time a court examines the no duty to warn rule, it
should hold that the rule is contrary to Illinois common law.'m

218. See supra notes 28-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the no
duty to warn rule as applied in Illinois.
219. See Part II (A)l and (A)2 of this Comment for a discussion of the no
duty to warn rule and Illinois case law that conflicts with the application of
the no duty to warn rule.
220. See Part II (B) of this Comment for a discussion of the no duty to warn
rule and state and federal legislation that conflicts with the no duty to warn
rule.
221. See Part II (C) of this Comment for a discussion of the conflicts between
the profession of pharmacy and the no duty to warn rule.
222. See Advincula v. United Blood Serv., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1020 (Ill. 1996)

(holding that professionals are to be held to a professional standard of care);
Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, 562 N.E.2d 967, 968 (Ill. 1990) (setting forth the
necessary elements of a negligence action in Illinois).
223. See Advincula, 678 N.E.2d at 1020 (finding that professionals must
adhere to a higher standard of care); Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968 (setting

forth the necessary elements of a negligence action in Illinois).
224. See Advincula, 678 N.E.2d at 1020 (holding that professionals are to be
held to a professional standard of care); Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968

(discussing the elements necessary to make out a negligence action in Illinois).
225. See supra notes 147-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
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First, the court.should state that it is erroneous to conclude that a
defendant pharmacist has no duty to a plaintiff without first
examining the relationship between the pharmacist and the
plaintiff.226 Second, the court should state that pharmacists have a
duty to conform to the professional pharmacist standard of care,
and that duty is circumvented by the no duty to warn rule.
The court should hold, just as the Illinois Supreme Court has
unambiguously held, that in order to determine whether a duty
exists, courts should examine the relationship between the parties
to determine whether the risk of harm to the plaintiff was likely or
reasonably foreseeable."?
Absent such a consideration, it is
improper for a court to determine that no duty exists.2" The court
should hold that since the no duty to warn rule precludes any
inquiry into the relationship between the plaintiff and the
pharmacist, the rule is contrary to Illinois common law. 229
Additionally, the court should note that the no duty to warn rule
abrogates the Illinois pharmacist professional standard of care.O
Once a court examines the no duty to warn rule with respect to
both Illinois common law negligence claims and the general tort
the no duty to warn rule is contrary to Illinois common law.
226. See supra notes 154-167 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
failure of the no duty to warn rule to inquire into the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant in order to determine whether a duty exists.
227. Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968. See Proctor v. Upjohn, 682 N.E.2d 1203,
1211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (stating "[a] duty to warn exists only when there is
'unequal knowledge and the defendant, possessed of such knowledge, knows or
should know that harm might occur if no warning is given.') (emphasis
added).
228. Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968. See also Advincula, 678 N.E.2d at 1021
("It remains the case, however, that while professional conduct in Illinois will
be measured against a professional standard, all persons, including
professionals, both medical and nonmedical [sic], are also obligated, generally
to exercise due care or ordinary care, commensurate with the apparent risk.");
Rhodes v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1267 (Ill. 1996) ("[Iun
resolving whether a duty exists, a court must determine whether there is a
relationship between the parties requiring that a legal obligation be imposed
upon one for the benefit of the other.") (emphasis added); Jackson v. Michael
Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 689 N.E.2d 205, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) ("To
determine if a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff, we must decide whether
their relationship was such that the law imposed upon the defendant an
obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff.") (emphasis
added).
229. See supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Illinois common law requiring a court to inquire into whether a defendant
stands in a relationship to a plaintiff that requires the imposition of a duty.
230. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 56, at 356 (discussing the standard
of care in cases of negligence). See also The Pharmacist'sDuty Under OBRA90 Standards, supra note 136, at 495-96 (discussing the application of
Prosser's hornbook on torts in an emerging trend in pharmacy litigation away
from the no duty to warn). For further discussion, see also Part II (A)l and
(A)2 of this Comment.
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law concepts of duty and standard of care, the court should have
ample authority to eliminate the no duty to warn rule.23 '
B. Legislative Solution
Additionally, the Illinois legislature could eliminate the no
duty to warn rule. The legislature could amend the PPA to state
that pharmacists have a duty to warn a patient or the physician, if
in their professional judgments, pharmacists believe a possible
problem exists with a patient's drug therapy.32 Since the IPhA
had substantial input into the PPA, the Illinois legislature should
not have difficulty passing an amendment to the PPA that reflects
the IPhA's position against the no duty to warn rule.m
One of the concerns with eliminating the no duty to warn rule
is a fear of increased drug costs. Generally, this fear is based on
the idea that exposing pharmacists to liability (and litigation)
would cause higher costs to insurers and that cost would be passed
on to consumers resulting in higher drug costs. However, it is
unlikely that the elimination of the no duty to warn rule would
cause an increase in drug costs. Arguably, the elimination of the
no duty to warn rule could decrease the cost of prescription drugs
by way of fewer injuries, less litigation, and lower
insurance/health care costs.'
For example, elimination of the no
duty to warn rule will encourage pharmacist activism and thereby:
(1) help prevent a patient from consuming a drug, or drug
combination that may cause injury; increase a patient's knowledge
of the drugs they are receiving; and accordingly decrease the
number of injures attributed to prescription drugs;
(2) lower patient injuries which lead to lower health care and
insurance costs incurred by such injuries, and lessen litigation
based on prescription drug injuries; and
231. See supra notes 147-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of

common law negligence claim and the general tort law concepts of duty and
standard of care as applicable to the no duty to warn rule in Illinois.
232. The PPA currently defines the "practice of pharmacy" as the care to
patients which may include providing information on drug interactions and
side effects. The Pharmacy Practice Act of 1987, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/3(d)
(West 1996). The PPA could be amended to include specific language that
states "the practice of pharmacy shall include providing patients with
information on drug interactions and side effects when, in the pharmacist's
professional judgment, such warnings are deemed necessary."
Id.
Additionally, the legislative declaration of the PPA could be amended to state
that "Ipiharmacists should be held to a professional standard of care that shall
promote the public health, safety, and welfare," or similar language to that
effect. Id.
233. Supplemental Memorandum Amicus Curiae of the Illinois Pharmacists
Association at 9-12, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992)
(No. 72908).

234. Id. at 11-12.

The John MarshallLaw Review

(3)

[33:425

lower heath care and insurance costs as well as less

litigation which will save insurers, health care providers, and the
general public money.
Pharmacists do much more than simply fill prescriptions.'
Along with its other imperfections, the no duty to warn rule
prevents pharmacists from achieving the professional recognition
they deserve."s
Pharmacists are highly educated health care
professionals with extensive knowledge of pharmaceuticals."?
Pharmacists are most often in the best position to educate patients
regarding a drug's potential dangers.2" The positive impact that a

235. See The Pharmacy Practice Act § 3(d) (defining the practice of
pharmacy as including- (1) patient counseling; (2) monitoring drug use and
prospective drug utilization review; (3) providing information on drug
interactions, side effects, drug use, and selection of medications; (4)
participation in drug selection and monitoring usage; and (5) compounding
and dispensing drugs and medical devices). See also supra notes 82-83 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Breslin's special concurrence in Suarez
where Justice Breslin states that pharmacists do more than only fill
prescriptions). Additionally, pharmacists earn a respectable salary for the
difficult work they are required to perform; the national median salary of a
pharmacist in 1996 was $55,300. Kelly Smith, Invest in Yourself - Salary
Roundup, MONEY, Sept. 1998, at 133. By way of comparison, the 1997-1998
national median salary of an attorney in private practice was $76,400. Id.
236. Roseann B. Termini, The Pharmacist Duty to Warn Revisited: The
Changing Role of Pharmacy in Health Care and the Resultant Impact on the
Obligationof A Pharmacistto Warn, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 551, 556 (1998).

Today the role of the pharmacist has indeed changed from that of
counting and pouring to one of a professional with an active role. The
advent of the active role encompasses greater responsibilities. Today
public policy dictates that, especially for addictive type drugs, the
professional pharmacist should assume the duty to refuse to fill a valid
prescription. Consequently, imposing the higher standard not only in
terms of a duty to warn but also in terms of the refusal to fill a valid
prescription could ultimately lessen litigation because the customer is
now informed. Furthermore, the pharmacist will finally achieve the
professional recognition deserved.
Id. at 565-66.
237. See The Pharmacist'sDuty Under OBRA-90 Standards,supra note 136,
at 503 (stating that a "[p]harmacist's knowledge of drugs surpasses that of any
other health professional."). For example, the Midwestern University Chicago
College of Pharmacy program requires, inter alia, nine quarter hours of
pharmaceutics, seventeen quarter hours of pharmacotherapeutics, ten quarter
hours of pharmacology, three quarter hours of clinical pharmacokinetics, three
quarter hours of pharmacy law, and three quarter hours of quality assurance
and effective pharmacy practice. Midwestern University, 1998/1999 Catalog
CCP 10 (1998). By comparison, the Midwestern University Chicago College of
Osteopathic Medicine requires only twenty weeks of pharmacology
instruction. Id. at CCOM 13.
238. See BRUSHWOOD, supra note 130, § 8.3, at 244 (stating that
pharmacists are proximate to patients and may know each patient's
characteristics). See also The Pharmacist'sDuty Under OBRA-90 Standards,
supra note 136, at 503 (stating that pharmacists are gatekeepers that can help
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pharmacist has in a patient's drug therapy can be substantial."' A
recent study found that when a pharmacist accompanied
physicians on medical rounds in an intensive care unit, the rate of
preventable adverse drug events decreased by sixty-six percent.'
Additionally, physicians accepted ninety-nine percent of all
recommendations made by pharmacists.24 This positive impact of
pharmacists is not surprising considering the superior
pharmacological knowledge that pharmacists possess. 2
While the no duty to warn rule does not prevent pharmacists
from voluntarily warning a customer, it does prevent pharmacists
from a legal obligation to warn in any situation. The no duty to
warn rule should cease to exist not only because the rule is
inconsistent with Illinois common law, but because eliminating
the rule can save lives.'
CONCLUSION

The pharmacist's no duty to warn rule is both flawed and
unnecessary.
The rule upsets Illinois common law, ignores
legislative intent, and undermines the profession of pharmacy.
Illinois requires a standard of care for pharmacists. At times, that
standard of care may require a pharmacist to provide a warning.
Therefore, it is wrong for Illinois to have a blanket no duty to warn
rule that prevents pharmacists from being held to that standard.
Illinois courts should be allowed to inquire whether a pharmacist
has breached a duty to conform to the professional pharmacist
standard of care by failing to warn.
detect and prevent potential problems with a patient's drug therapy).
Patients may also be in a better position to discuss their illness and treatment
with their pharmacists because, on average, a patient has a mere 23.1 seconds

to voice their concerns before being redirected by their physician. M. Kim
Marvel et al., Soliciting the Patient'sAgenda - Have We Improved?, 281 JAMA

283, 286 (1999).
239. Charles Marwick, Drug Safety Takes Cooperation, 282 JAMA 267, 267-

70 (1999).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See supra note 237 for a discussion of the pharmacological education of
pharmacists.

243. It is estimated that prescription drugs are involved in as many as
100,000 deaths per year. MOORE, PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER 17 (1998). It
has also been estimated that prescription drugs severely injure one million
people per year. Id. at 48. An individual has a twenty-six percent lifetime
chance of being severely injured by a prescription medication, compared to a
two percent chance of being severely injured in an automobile accident and a
smoker's nine percent chance of dying from lung cancer. Id. at 49.
Consequently, if a pharmacist warns a patient of a possible danger of a

prescription drug, then the patient has a better opportunity to avoid that
danger and prevent serious injury or death as a result of the prescription
drug. Id.
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The no duty to warn rule is illogical, and while the rule may
have seemed prudent at one time, it should cease to exist. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes said: "precedents survive in the law long
after ... the reason for them has been forgotten .... The result of
following them must often be failure and confusion from the
merely logical point of view. " '

244. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881).

